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Abstract—We present Component-Based Simplex Architecture
(CBSA), a new framework for assuring the runtime safety of
component-based cyber-physical systems (CPSs). CBSA inte-
grates Assume-Guarantee (A-G) reasoning with the core princi-
ples of the Simplex control architecture to allow component-based
CPSs to run advanced, uncertified controllers while still providing
runtime assurance that A-G contracts and global properties are
satisfied. In CBSA, multiple Simplex instances, which can be
composed in a nested, serial or parallel manner, coordinate to
assure system-wide properties.
Combining A-G reasoning and the Simplex architecture is a
challenging problem that yields significant benefits. By utilizing
A-G contracts, we are able to compositionally determine the
switching logic for CBSAs, thereby alleviating the state explosion
encountered by other approaches. Another benefit is that we
can use A-G proof rules to decompose the proof of system-wide
safety assurance into sub-proofs corresponding to the component-
based structure of the system architecture. We also introduce the
notion of coordinated switching between Simplex instances, a key
component of our compositional approach to reasoning about
CBSA switching logic.
We illustrate our framework with a component-based control
system for a ground rover. We formally prove that the CBSA for
this system guarantees energy safety (the rover never runs out
of power), and collision freedom (the rover never collides with
a stationary obstacle). We also consider a CBSA for the rover
that guarantees mission completion: all target destinations visited
within a prescribed amount of time.
Index Terms—Simplex architecture; Assume-guarantee rea-
soning; Component-based system architecture; Cyber-physical
systems; Collision avoidance
I. INTRODUCTION
Simplex [1]–[3] is a software architecture for high-assurance
process-control systems. It traditionally consists of a phys-
ical plant and two versions of the controller: an advanced
controller (AC) and a baseline controller (BC). The AC is
in control of the plant under nominal operating conditions,
and is designed to achieve high-performance according to
certain metrics (e.g., maneuverability, fuel economy, mission-
completion time). The BC is pre-certified to keep the plant
within a prescribed safety region, i.e., a region of safe op-
eration. A decision module (DM), which is also pre-certified,
continually monitors the state of the plant and switches control
of the plant to the BC should the plant be in imminent danger
(i.e., within the next update period) of exiting the safety region.
As such, Simplex is a very powerful architecture. It assures
that the plant is properly controlled even if the advanced con-
troller has bugs. As advanced controllers are increasingly more
complex, more adaptive with the use of unverified algorithms
such as machine-learning’s, runtime assurance techniques like
Simplex are becoming more important. Figure 1 illustrates the
Simplex architecture.
Fig. 1. The Simplex architecture. The Decision Module and Baseline
Controller are pre-certified.
The Simplex architecture was developed 20 years ago. Since
then, control systems have evolved to take on a more complex
structure consisting of multiple controllers, each with a distinct
functionality. For example, an autonomous vehicle might have
a hierarchical control system consisting of controllers for (in
order of decreasing level of abstraction) mission-planning,
guidance, navigation, and inner-loop control. A system of
this form is illustrated in Fig. 2. Furthermore, some of these
controllers themselves may have a hierarchical or nested
structure.
Advanced control systems are not necessarily hierarchical,
but are better understood as having a component-based ar-
chitecture. A “component” may be a software module or the
distinguished physical-plant node (we do not consider multiple
physical plants, because a physical plant can be arbitrarily
complex). It is important to have runtime assurance techniques
for component-based control systems that are equally modular,
to reduce their associated complexity and cost.
Components may have different update periods (or ex-
ecution periods). For the autonomous-vehicle example, the
mission-planning component’s update period may be a multi-
ple of navigation’s, which in turn may be a multiple of inner-
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loop’s. The composition of these components is a multi-rate
component. Our framework allows this multi-rate characteris-
tic to be modeled explicitly.
Adapting the Simplex architecture to component-based
systems is non-trivial. On the one hand, wrapping a large
monolithic Simplex instance around the entire control system
violates modularity principles, making the design and verifica-
tion of the system more difficult. On the other hand, naively
wrapping each component of the system in an independent
Simplex container is inadequate to ensure system-wide prop-
erties, because of interactions between components.
For example, to guarantee that a ground rover never runs
out of power, the mission-planning controller might change
the current target to the most recently observed power station
when it detects that the battery level is low. It needs to rely
on specific properties of other components to ensure that the
rover can reach the power station in question before depleting
the battery, and these properties might not be assured by the
advanced controllers of those components. This example also
highlights the need for a compositional proof technique, since
a property is assured not by a single Simplex instance, but
rather by multiple cooperating instances.
Assume-Guarantee (A-G) reasoning [4]–[6] is a powerful
compositional proof technique. With this approach, to prove
that a system composed of components M1 and M2 satisfies
a property q, one shows that M1 satisfies q under assumptions
p and that M2 satisfies p. Assumption p and guarantee q of
M1 are specified in M1’s A-G contract. A-G contracts specify
a component’s behavior for a single time step, and inductive
reasoning about contracts is used to prove system-wide in-
variants. Furthermore, this approach is applicable to arbitrary
safety properties, as a safety property can be expressed as an
invariant by adding auxiliary variables [7].
Contributions. In this paper, we present Component-Based
Simplex Architecture (CBSA), a new framework for assuring
the runtime safety of component-based cyber-physical sys-
tems. CBSA integrates Assume-Guarantee reasoning with the
core principles of the Simplex control architecture to allow
component-based control systems to run advanced, uncertified
controllers while still being able to provide runtime assurance
that A-G contracts, and the global invariants they imply, are
satisfied.
A novelty of CBSA is that by utilizing A-G contracts, we
are able to compositionally determine Simplex switching logic,
thereby alleviating the state explosion problem encountered by
other approaches. Prior methods [8]–[10] for deriving Simplex
switching logic are not designed to be modular, so components
would need to be composed into a monolithic system before
applying these approaches. In contrast, we compositionally
derive Simplex switching logic for a component using assump-
tions it makes about its environment. These assumptions are
then discharged by the guarantees specified in A-G contracts
of other components.
Another feature of CBSA is its use of A-G reasoning as
a proof technique for runtime assurance. In CBSA, Simplex
instances are used to guarantee local, component-based A-G
contracts. These contracts specify, for each component, the
assumptions it makes about its environment and the guarantees
it provides if the environment satisfies those assumptions. A-G
reasoning, based on A-G proof rules, is used at compile time
to provide runtime assurance of global safety properties from
the locally assured A-G contracts.
CBSA also introduces the notion of coordinated switching
among Simplex-based components. This is needed when the
violation of a contract in one component leads to a cascade of
contract violations in other components, thereby necessitating
synchronized switching to ensure that the desired system
properties are not violated.
Another contribution of the paper is a detailed case study
that thoroughly illustrates the principles of CBSA. In particu-
lar, we show how to apply our framework to a component-
based control system for the Quickbot ground rover [11].
The Quickbot control system includes a Mission Planning
component, which selects targets (i.e., destinations), and a
Navigation component, which steers the rover to its next target
destination.
We use A-G reasoning to formally prove that the CBSA
for this system guarantees two safety properties: (i) energy
safety (ES), which ensures the rover never runs out of power,
and (ii) collision freedom (CF), which ensures the rover
never collides with an obstacle. This example illustrates the
unique characteristics of CBSA. The switching logic in all
Simplex instances is designed to guarantee component-based
A-G contracts. Moreover, coordinated switching between the
Mission Planning and Navigation components is required to
ensure ES.
The ES property illustrates how we use A-G contracts to
compositionally construct Simplex switching logic. To ensure
energy safety, the rover backtracks to the most recently visited
power station when the battery level drops below a threshold.
We compositionally derive this threshold for the Mission
Planning’s switching logic by using a guarantee in the contract
of the Navigation component. This guarantee assures that the
energy the rover needs to backtrack to the most recently
visited power station will not exceed the forward energy it
has expended to travel from this power station to the current
position.
Navigation assures this guarantee by using a Simplex in-
stance that must switch in tandem with Mission Planning’s in-
stance. Therefore, we enforce a coordinated switching between
Mission Planning and Navigation to ensure the satisfaction of
both components’ A-G contracts and the global energy safety
property they imply.
We additionally consider a Mission Completion (MC) prop-
erty for the Quickbot system, i.e., all target destinations are
visited within a prescribed amount of time. This property is
interesting not only because it is a (bounded) liveness property,
a type of property not traditionally handled by Simplex, but
also because it is a higher-level mission-oriented property
several layers of control removed from the physical plant. The
MC property is also more software-oriented in nature, as it
revolves around a software data structure (a list of mission
targets).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
considers related work. Section III formally introduces our
CBSA framework. Sections IV and V present the Quickbot
case studies. Section VI offers our concluding remarks and
directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The relationship of our work with the classical Simplex
architecture is discussed in Section I.
Schierman et al. developed a runtime assurance technique
similar to Simplex, known simply as RTA [12], [13]. RTA can
be applied to component-based systems, but each RTA wrapper
(i.e., each Simplex-like instance) independently ensures a local
safety property of a component. For example, in [12], RTA
instances for an inner-loop controller and a guidance system
are uncoordinated and thereby operate independently. Their
work does not consider A-G contracts or cooperation between
components to ensure global properties like we do in this
paper.
Schierman et al. recently extended their work on RTA by
showing how it can be used to ensure that components satisfy
A-G contracts [14]. They apply RTA to, and give A-G con-
tracts for, several components in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) flight control system. They do not use formal A-G proof
rules to derive global invariants. Instead, they reason about the
overall safety of the system using Goal-Structuring Notation
(GSN), which is less formal. They discuss the potential need
for coordinated switching, but coordinated switching is not
used in their case study.
A-G reasoning has been extensively studied for the compo-
sitional verification of complex systems (e.g., [4]–[6], [15]–
[19]). There is also significant tool support for A-G reasoning,
including AGREE [20], OCRA [21], and Safety ADD [22].
AGREE is a framework that supports A-G reasoning on
architectural models specified in AADL. OCRA supports the
specification of A-G contracts using temporal logic and can
also be used to verify the correctness of contract refinements.
Safety ADD is a tool for defining A-G contracts and verifying
that all guarantee-assumption pairs match and there are no
unfulfilled assumptions. A-G reasoning has also been used for
compositionally checking source code for preservation of the
design’s correctness [23].
In [24], compositional barrier functions are used to provably
guarantee the simultaneous satisfaction of composed objec-
tives. They rely on a single controller and an optimization
based approach to correct the controller when violations of
safety are imminent, which has limited capability and less
flexibility compared to Simplex.
None of these approaches, however, consider the possi-
bility of pairing A-G reasoning with techniques for runtime
assurance of system properties. Our approach integrates A-
G reasoning with the core principles of Simplex, allowing
component-based systems to run advanced, uncertified con-
trollers while still being able to provide runtime assurance
that A-G contracts, and the global invariants they imply, are
satisfied.
A comparison between our work and the Simplex switching-
logic-derivation techniques in [8]–[10] is given in Section I.
Without A-G contracts and our concept of coordinated switch-
ing, those approaches could be extended as follows to apply
to systems with multiple Simplex instances. Suppose there
are n Simplex instances, and s is the decision period. A
global decision module can choose among 2n possible con-
troller configurations (baseline or advanced for each Simplex
instance). For each of these 2n configurations, do backward
reachability analysis [9] with an unbounded time horizon
for the system composed from the selected controllers and
the plant, using maximally nondeterministic models for the
advanced controllers, to obtain a recoverable region for that
configuration. At each decision time, the global decision
module checks whether (1) all states reachable in time at most
s using the current controller configuration are safe, and (2) all
states reachable in time exactly s using the current controller
configuration are in the recoverable region of the current
controller configuration. If so, the decision module continues
to use the current configuration; otherwise, it switches to a
controller configuration for which these two conditions hold.
III. COMPONENT-BASED SIMPLEX ARCHITECTURE
A. Multi-rate Components
Definition 1. A multi-rate component M is a tuple (x, u, y,
S), where x = {x1, ..., xm} is the set of state variables, u =
{u1, ..., uk} is the set of input variables, y = {y1, ..., yn} is
the set of output variables, and S = {(f1, g1, s1), ..., (fl, gl,
sl)} is a sequence whose i-th element is a triple of a next-state
function fi, an output function gi, and their update period si,
which is a positive integer multiplier of the global clock tick
dt. The sets of input and output variables are disjoint. The
behavior of M at tick i is defined as follows.{
x(i) = fj (x(i− 1), u(i)) ,∀j ∈ [1..l] : i mod sj = 0
y(i) = gj (x(i), u(i)) ,∀j ∈ [1..l] : i mod sj = 0
where the set assignment A = B means only the variables
in A ∩ B are assigned the corresponding values in B. The
variables in A that are not updated at tick i retain the values
they had at tick i− 1.
We give examples of components in Section IV-B.
B. Composition with Feedback
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions about
multi-rate components.
1) Components communicate via shared variables. After a
component writes a shared variable, the updated value is
instantly available to be read by all components.
2) If a component writes and another component reads a
shared variable at the same tick, then there must be a
predetermined order of execution of the two components.
The order of execution of M1 ‖ M2 is M1, M2. This
means the composition operator ‖ is associative but not
necessarily commutative.
3) The execution time of a component is negligible.
4) A 1-tick delay is introduced in feedback loops to break
circularity. A feedback loop exists between two compo-
nents M1 = (x1, u1, y1, S1) and M2 = (x2, u2, y2, S2) if
y1 ∩u2 6= ∅ and y2 ∩u1 6= ∅. If the order of execution is
M1, M2 then the variables in y2 that feed back into u1
are delayed by one tick; i.e., y2(i − 1) is supplied to fi
and gi of M1 instead of y2(i).
Two components M1 = (x1, u1, y1, S1) and M2 = (x2, u2,
y2, S2) are composable if x1 ∩ x2 = ∅ and y1 ∩ y2 = ∅.
Definition 2. Let M1 and M2 be composable. Then their
composition M1 ‖ M2 is the component (x, u, y, S), where
x = x1∪x2∪ (y1∩u2)∪ (y2∩u1), u = (u1∪u2)− (y1∪y2),
y = y1 ∪ y2, and S = S1 ∪ S2.
Functions fi and gi of M1 ‖M2 ignore variables in x and u
that are not their original arguments. Note that the connected
inputs (y1 ∩ u2) ∪ (y2 ∩ u1) are hidden from u and added to
x. This is necessary to ensure functions fi, gi can still access
their required variables. The variables in x∩y are synchronized
and updated by functions gi. Because the order of execution is
M1, M2, functions fi and gi in S1 are executed before those
in S2.
Remark. Our definition of component is similar to [25] except
we have multi-rate. Our form of non-commutative composition
can be regarded as a shorthand for a combination of cascade
composition and feedback composition in [25]. For example,
suppose component M1 reads variable x and writes variable y,
and component M2 reads y and writes x. To obtain a system
equivalent to our composition M1 ‖M2 using the combinators
in [25], one can first construct a cascade composition of M1,
M2, and a unit delay state machine MD that delays x by one
tick, and then perform a feedback composition on the resulting
component.
C. Assume-Guarantee Contracts
To prove system properties in CBSA, we use A-G reasoning
in the form of A-G contracts [26]. That is, with every com-
ponent M of a CBSA, we associate a contract of the form
C = (I,O,A,G), where I is a set of typed input variables,
O is a set of typed output variables, A is an assumptions
predicate, and G is a guarantees predicate. Note that a contract
cannot guarantee a system-wide property involving a (global)
variable that does not belong to the contract. A contract
should only talk about the assumptions and guarantees of
its inputs and outputs. A-G contracts allow compositional
reasoning about CBSAs using the A-G reasoning rule given in
Section III-D. In CBSA, the switching logic for the Simplex
instance of a component is based on determining whether the
active AC might violate the component’s guarantees in the next
decision period. Furthermore, the composition of all active
controllers must imply the safety properties of the system.
This principle results in a requirement that the composition of
all BCs in a CBSA must imply the safety properties of the
system in case all components must switch to their BCs.
D. Assume-Guarantee Proof Rule
An assume-guarantee triple of the form 〈p〉M [s] 〈q〉 means
component M guarantees the satisfaction of property q up to
and including time t+s·dt under the assumption that property
p is satisfied at time t, where s is an update period of M , t
is the beginning of the current update period, and dt is the
global tick. By induction over time, 〈true〉M [s] 〈p〉 implies
M always satisfies p.
The choice of update period s in 〈p〉M [s] 〈q〉 is guided
by the property q. If q is given in terms of the variables of
a single-rate sub-component of M , then the update period
of that sub-component is an appropriate choice for s. If q
involves variables from multiple sub-components, then the
shortest update period of these sub-components is a good
choice for s.
We use the following Assume-Guarantee rule as a formal
proof rule for multi-rate systems because it is general enough
to handle most cases of interest, including our case studies.
The rule we use is asymmetric in the sense that only one
component makes assumptions about the other component.
Other A-G proof rules, including symmetric ones (e.g. [27]),
can also be used with our framework.
Rule AG. 〈p〉M1 [s1] 〈q〉
〈true〉M2 [s2] 〈p〉
〈true〉 (M1 ‖M2) [s1] 〈q〉
Rule AG allows one to prove that a system composed of
components M1 and M2 satisfies a property q by proving
that (1) component M1 guarantees q under assumption p, and
(2) component M2 assures p unconditionally.
E. Coordinated Switching
Coordinated switching is when a switch from AC to BC
in one component forces another component to also switch
from AC to BC. Suppose components M1 and M2 use
Simplex to ensure their contracts C1 = (I1, O1, A1, G1) and
C2 = (I2, O2, A2, G2), respectively. Assuming A2 = true
and G2 |= A1, where φ |= ϕ means φ entails ϕ, we have
M1 ‖ M2 |= G1 by applying Rule AG. Let ACi and BCi be
the AC and BC, respectively, of Mi. A typical situation that
requires coordinated switching is as follows. Suppose G2 is
the implication φ1 ⇒ φ2, and φ1 involves a shared variable
that M1 modifies when switching from AC1 to BC1 such that
φ1 changes from false to true as a result. Suppose BC2 ensures
φ2 but AC2 does not. When M1 uses AC1, G2 is vacuously
true. When M1 uses BC1, M2 must use BC2 to satisfy G2.
Thus, if M2 is using AC2 when M1 switches to BC1, then
M2 must perform a coordinated switch to BC2.
Coordinated switching is required in our case study. The
Mission Planning component has a BC called the recharge
controller, which tells the rover to go back to the most
recently visited power station to recharge. When Mission
Planning switches to its BC, it assumes that the Navigation
component can steer the rover to that power station within a
certain energy budget. The BC in the Navigation component
guarantees this energy constraint, but the AC does not. Thus,
when the Mission Planning component switches to its BC,
the Navigation component must also switch to its BC. In this
example, the shared variable in φ1 that communicates the need
for the Navigation component to switch is the variable ctlr,
which explicitly indicates which controller is in control of the
Mission Planning component.
Coordinated switching can be generalized to be between
modes. A component may have multiple modes with different
guarantees. Each mode can use a Simplex instance to assure
its guarantees. When a component M1 switches modes, it may
require component M2 to switch to another mode so that
it can use the guarantee that M2’s new mode provides. In
our example above, we can view Mission Planning as having
two modes, named go-to-target and recharge, and Navigation
as having two modes, named go-to-target and backtrack.
When Mission Planning switches to recharge mode, it requires
Navigation to switch to backtrack mode. In our case study,
recharge mode and backtrack mode use certified controllers,
so we do not need to nest Simplex instances in them.
IV. THE QUICKBOT CASE STUDY
We conducted a detailed case study of our approach based
on the Quickbot [11] ground rover developed for the Coursera
course Control of Mobile Robots (https://www.coursera.org/
course/conrob/). The rover’s mission is to visit a sequence
of predetermined target locations. We consider a challenging
version of the problem: the rover might need to recharge at
power stations during the mission, and the rover does not have
a map showing the locations of power stations or the locations
and shapes of obstacles.
The top-level architecture for the Quickbot case study
consists of three single-rate components: Mission Planning,
Navigation, Inner-Loop & Plant; see Fig. 2. Mission Plan-
ning’s update period sMP is a multiple of Navigation’s sNav ,
which in turn is a multiple of Inner-Loop & Plant’s sILP . The
Quickbot system composed of these components is therefore a
multi-rate component. Mission Planning sends the next target
position T to the Navigation component. Navigation steers the
rover to T while avoiding obstacles. It does this by computing
an appropriate target linear velocity vector (vT ) and target
angular velocity (ωT ) at each time step. The pair of velocities
(vT , ωT ) is sent to Inner-Loop & Plant, which computes and
actuates the appropriate rotational speeds for each of the two
wheels to reach the desired velocities.
The rover is equipped with infrared (IR) sensors, two
wheel encoders (which count revolutions of the wheels), a
power-station sensor, and a battery-level sensor. Inner-Loop
& Plant converts the raw sensor data into the rover’s current
position (p), linear velocity vector (v), angular velocity (ω), IR
distances (ir) to obstacles, location of the last-detected power
station (PS), and battery level (B).
We use MP, Nav and ILP to denote the Mission Planning,
Navigation and Inner-Loop & Plant components, respectively,
and QB to denote the entire Quickbot system. QB is the
parallel composition of MP, Nav, and ILP, i.e., QB = MP ‖
Nav ‖ ILP . ILP is implicitly the parallel composition of the
Inner-Loop Control component and the physical plant.
Fig. 2. Component-based Simplex architecture for Quickbot rover.
A. Problem Statement and Assumptions
We design a CBSA whose mission is to visit the specified
targets while ensuring the following safety properties.
1) Energy safety (ES): the rover never runs out of power.
2) Collision freedom (CF): the rover never collides with an
obstacle.
We make the following assumptions about the rover.
1) The rover does not have a map of the environment.
2) There are gaps (blind spots) between the fields-of-view
of the distance sensors.
3) The distance sensors have a limited sensing range [0, Rs].
4) The rover can stop instantaneously.
5) The linear speed v is bounded by v ∈ [0, vmax].
6) The rotational speed ω is bounded by ω ∈
[−ωmax, ωmax].
7) The rover can reach any pair of values (v, ω) instanta-
neously, provided they are within bounds.
8) The rover starts at a power station.
9) The rover can detect a power station when passing within
distance dPS of it.
10) The rover can recharge when it is within distance dPS of
a power station.
11) The power consumption of the rover is a monotonically
increasing function of the rotational speeds of the two
wheels.
We make the following assumptions about the environment.
1) Obstacles are stationary polyhedra.
2) There is a known lower bound on the internal angles
between edges of an obstacle.
3) There is a known lower bound on the edge lengths of an
obstacle.
4) The separation between obstacles is such that whenever
two adjacent sensors simultaneously detect an obstacle,
they are detecting the same obstacle.
Assumptions 1-7 about the rover and 1-4 about obstacles
are the same as in [28]. This allows us to reuse the Simplex
instance in [28] to help ensure the CF property. Let AP denote
the conjunction of the above assumptions about the rover. We
assume ILP satisfies AP .
B. Quickbot CBSA
The architecture of the Quickbot CBSA is shown in Fig. 2.
A novelty of our case study is that we apply the Simplex
architecture to the Mission Planning component; Simplex is
traditionally applied to lower-level controllers that interact
directly with the plant. In our component-based architecture,
Mission Planning controls a virtual plant comprising the
Navigation component, the Inner-Loop Control component,
and the physical plant.
Quickbot Components We illustrate Definition 1 with the
Quickbot components. The single-rate Mission Planning com-
ponent is MP = (xMP , uMP , yMP , SMP ), where xMP = {T,
ctlr}, uMP = {p,B,PS ,W}, yMP = {T, ctlr}, and SMP =
(fMP , gMP , sMP ). Here fMP and gMP are the next-state and
output functions representing the algorithm for MP described
later in this section, and sMP is the update period of MP. The
behavior of MP at global tick i is specified by:{
xMP (i) = fMP (xMP (i− 1), uMP (i)) if i mod sMP = 0
yMP (i) = gMP (xMP (i), uMP (i)) , if i mod sMP = 0
The single-rate Navigation component is Nav = (xNav ,
uNav , yNav , SNav ), where xNav = {vT , ωT ,W}, uNav = {T,
ctlr, p, v, ω, ir}, yNav = {vT , ωT ,W}, and SNav = (fNav ,
gNav , sNav ). Here fNav and gNav are the next-state and output
functions representing the algorithm for Nav described later
in this section, and sNav is the update period of Nav. The
behavior of Nav at global tick i is specified by:{
xNav (i) = fNav (xNav (i− 1), uNav (i)) if i mod sNav = 0
yNav (i) = gNav (xNav (i), uNav (i)) , if i mod sNav = 0
The single-rate Inner-Loop & Plant component is ILP =
(xILP , uILP , yILP , SILP ), where xILP = {p, v, ω, ir, PS,B},
uILP = {vT , ωT }, yILP = {p, v, ω, ir, PS,B}, and SILP =
(fILP , gILP , sILP ). Here fILP and gILP are the next-state and
output functions representing the dynamics and sensing of ILP,
and sILP is the update period of ILP. The behavior of ILP at
global tick i is specified by:{
xILP (i) = fILP (xILP (i− 1), uILP (i)) if i mod sILP = 0
yILP (i) = gILP (xILP (i), uILP (i)) , if i mod sILP = 0
where fILP and gILP are the next-state and output functions
representing the dynamics and sensing of ILP. The order of
execution is MP and then Nav (in time steps when they both
execute) and then ILP . We assume sMP is a multiple of sNav ,
and sNav is a multiple of sILP .
Quickbot Controllers Recall that we assume that the rover
can detect a power station within distance dPS , for example,
by using a camera to read a QR code or by using an RFID
reader to read a tag. When the rover passes near a power
station, it can determine with IR sensors whether the power
station is accessible from its current location; i.e., there are no
intervening obstacles. If the power station is accessible, the
rover remembers it as the last-visited (i.e., the most recently
passed) power station.
The Mission Planning AC informs the Navigation compo-
nent of the next target to be visited to fulfill the mission goals,
while the BC (the recharge controller) instructs the Navigation
component to navigate to the most recently detected power
station. We say that the rover is in recharge mode when DM1
has switched control to the recharge controller. To guarantee
that recharge mode will drive the rover to a power station
without depleting the battery, we need a certified backtrack-
to-power-station controller in the Navigation component. Since
the rover lacks a map of the environment, backtracking is the
most realistic way to guarantee that the rover can reach a
power station without running out of power.
We also briefly considered a variant of the problem in
which the rover has a map showing locations of power
stations. If the rover does not also have a map of obstacles,
backtracking to the last-visited power station might still be
necessary, because nearby power stations could be blocked
by unknown obstacles that would take too much power to
circumnavigate. More complex strategies for the AC in the
Mission Planning component could help avoid backtracking.
For example, instead of going as directly as possible to the
targets, it might add waypoints that are slightly out of the
way but help the rover determine accessibility of nearby power
stations.
Note that there is coordinated switching between the Mis-
sion Planning component and the Navigation component.
When Mission Planning switches to the recharge controller,
Navigation must switch to the backtrack controller. The
recharge controller in Mission Planning assumes that the
Navigation component can navigate the rover to a power
station using at most a specified amount of energy. The go-
to-target controller does not provide such guarantees, whereas
the backtrack-to-power-station controller (backtrack controller,
for short) does. This cascading switch is implemented by
hardwiring a decision signal from Mission Planning’s DM to
Navigation’s DM, as shown in Fig. 2.
We introduce a recorder module that records the positions
and heading angles (waypoints) at every time step of Naviga-
tion. When in recharge mode, the backtrack controller tracks
these recorded positions in reverse order. We also want the
backtrack controller to preserve the CF property so that the
rover is guaranteed not to collide with any static obstacles on
the way back to the last-visited power station. We consider
three designs for the backtrack controller.
1) Instead of recording waypoints, we can record the control
inputs (v, ω) for ILP in every Navigation time step. When
backtracking, we replay (v,−ω). This controller will
trace the forward path exactly provided that there are no
actuation or state estimation errors. Otherwise, the error
will accumulate.
2) The rover can backtrack from its current position to a
recorded waypoint by first turning in place to point to
the target waypoint and then moving in a straight line to
it. This approach is robust, but it is slow, consumes more
energy, and replaces a curve in the forward trajectory
with a line segment in the backward trajectory. Such
a discrepancy could lead to collisions unless the avoid-
obstacles controller is invoked.
3) The rover can backtrack from its current position to a
recorded waypoint by computing the appropriate values
of (v, ω). This means we need to solve the inverse
kinematics problem, which in general has no analytical
solution. We can, however, obtain the least-squares so-
lution, which has several benefits. If there are no errors
then the least-squares solution is an exact solution; i.e.,
this approach falls back to the first one. If there are errors,
the errors will be minimized in the least-squares sense and
bounded, instead of accumulating. Assuming the errors
are small, the trajectory during backtracking is always
close to the forward trajectory, and the energy consumed
during backtracking is within a bounded margin of the
energy consumed going forward. We adopt this approach
for the backtrack controller because of these benefits.
The rover can backtrack from its current position to a recorded
waypoint by computing the appropriate values of (v, ω). It
can do this by solving the inverse kinematics problem for the
least-squares solution. Suppose the rover is currently at point
A = (x1, y1, θ1) and wants to reach a recorded waypoint B =
(x2, y2, θ2) in one Navigation time step tNav . The kinematics
equation is given below.
x2 = x1 +
∫ t1+tNav
t1
v cos(θ1 + ωt)dt
y2 = y1 +
∫ t1+tNav
t1
v sin(θ1 + ωt)dt
θ2 = θ1 + ωtNav
(1)
The solution in the trivial case where θ1 = θ2 is ω = 0 and
v = AB/tNav . If θ1 6= θ2, Eq. 1 becomes: x2 = x1 +
v
ω (sin θ2 − sin θ1)
y2 = y1 +
v
ω (cos θ1 − cos θ2)
θ2 = θ1 + ωtNav
(2)
We solve Eq. 2 for the least-squares solution using the
standard least-squares method.
We reuse the Simplex instance in [28] to help ensure the
CF property. We nest this instance inside the AC of the
Simplex instance in Navigation. The intuition behind this
nested composition of Simplex instances is that the backtrack
controller also helps ensure the CF property, because it re-
traces a collision-free path the rover has already traveled.
Therefore, the Simplex instance involving AC2 and BC2 in
Fig. 2 assures the CF property.
Contracts of Quickbot Components Based on the above
analysis, we specify the following contracts. The Mission
Planning component’s contract is:
Inputs: p,PS , B,W
Outputs: T, ctlr
Assumption: ctlr = BC ⇒
BE (p,PS ,W ) ≤ (1 + BE )FE (PS , p)
Guarantee: B > E(p,PS )
where BE (p,PS ,W ) is the energy needed to backtrack from
the current position p to the most recently visited power station
PS going through the sequence of recorded waypoints W ;
BE is a constant defined in Section IV-C; FE (PS , p) is the
energy expended on the forward path from PS to p; E(p,PS )
is the energy needed to go from p to PS , including the
amount of energy needed to turn 180◦ before backtracking.
The Navigation component’s contract is:
Inputs: T, ctlr, p, ir, v, ω
Outputs: vT , ωT ,W
Assumption: AP
Guarantee: (do > 0) ∧ (ctlr = BC ⇒
BE (p,PS ,W ) ≤ (1 + BE )FE (PS , p))
where do is the shortest distance to an obstacle. The Inner-
Loop & Plant’s contract is:
Inputs: vT , ωT
Outputs: p,PS , B, ir, v, ω
Assumption: true
Guarantee: AP
The input and output variables of each component are shown
in Fig. 2.
C. Switching Logic for the ES Property
The ES property can be formally expressed as G(B > 0),
where G is the always (global) operator in linear temporal
logic. In our design, this is ensured by having the rover
recharge at a power station whenever the battery level is low.
So, we enforce the stricter property that the rover always has
enough energy to return to the last-visited power station. This
property is formalized as G(B > E(p,PS )), where E(p,PS )
is the amount of energy needed to go from the current position
p to the last-visited power station PS , including the amount
of energy needed to turn 180◦ (E180) before going back.
Hereafter, we refer to G(B > E(p,PS )) as the ES property.
We assume the following constants are known:
1) BE : a constant such that the backtracking energy BE (p,
PS, W) needed to backtrack from the current position p
to the last-visited power station PS through a sequence
of recorded waypoints W is bounded by (1+ BE ) times
the forward energy FE (PS, p) expended since PS was
last visited, i.e., BE (p,PS ,W ) ≤ (1 + BE )FE (PS , p).
If there are no errors in actuation or state estimation, we
can take BE = 0.
2) EMP : the worst-case energy expended in one update
period of Mission Planning by an arbitrary controller.
3) E180: the energy needed to turn in place by 180◦.
4) BEMP : a bound on the energy needed to backtrack from
the rover’s position at the end of the next update period
of Mission Planning to the current position.
Let EMP be the amount of energy expended when both wheels
rotate at maximum rotational speed for one update period of
Mission Planning. BEMP equals EMP .
The DM in the Mission Planning component decides
whether to continue to go forward or to return to PS. If it
decides to go forward, it must ensure that the ES property
holds at its next decision point. The worst-case amount of
energy needed to travel to a position within one update period
and then backtrack from that position to PS is EMP +E180+
BEMP + (1 + BE )FE (PS , p). The switching condition is
thus:
B ≤ EMP + E180 + BEMP + (1 + BE )FE (PS , p) (3)
This switching condition is derived compositionally by
relying on Mission Planning’s assumption, an assumption
that is later discharged by composing Mission Planning with
Navigation. We do not need to consider implementation details
of other components in the derivation process.
D. Proof Outlines of ES and CF
Lemma 1. For any property φ, 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈φ〉 ⇒
〈true〉 (Nav ‖ ILP) [sNav ] 〈φ〉.
Proof. The proof follows from our assumptions and one
application of Rule AG.
〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈φ〉
〈true〉 ILP [sILP ] 〈AP 〉
〈true〉Nav ‖ ILP [sNav ] 〈φ〉
Theorem 1. 〈true〉QB [sMP ] 〈ES 〉
Proof outline
1) We prove 〈ABE 〉MP [sMP ] 〈ES 〉, where ABE is the
assumption in MP ’s contract given in Section IV-B.
2) We prove 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈ABE 〉. By Lemma 1, this
implies 〈true〉 (Nav ‖ ILP) [sNav ] 〈ABE 〉.
3) Applying Rule AG, we conclude that
〈true〉 (MP ‖ Nav ‖ ILP) [sMP ] 〈ES 〉.
Theorem 2. 〈true〉QB [sMP ] 〈CF 〉
Proof outline
1) We prove 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈CF 〉. By Lemma 1, this
implies 〈true〉 (Nav ‖ ILP) [sNav ] 〈CF 〉.
2) Applying Rule AG, we conclude that
〈true〉 (MP ‖ Nav ‖ ILP) [sMP ] 〈CF 〉.
The full proofs of the ES and CF properties are provided
in Appendix A.
E. Experimental Results
We implemented the CBSA for the Quickbot rover in
Matlab using the following parameter values: (1) number of
distance sensors N = 8; (2) angle of detection of the sensors
βs = 5
◦; (3) maximum range of the sensors Rs = 0.8m;
(7) radius of the wheels r = 0.0325m; (8) distance between
the centers of the two wheels l = 0.09925m; (9) maximum
linear velocity vmax = 0.8m/s; (10) maximum angular ve-
locity ωmax = 7pi rad/s; (11) power station sensor detection
range dPS = 0.1m; (12) maximum battery level Bmax = 100.
We use a power model that is an affine function of the angular
velocities of the two wheels: P (ωl, ωr) = p1(|ωl|+ |ωr|)+p2,
where p1 and p2 are constants and ωl, ωr are the rotational
speeds of the two wheels. These are calculated from linear
velocity v and angular velocity ω as follows.{
ωl =
2v−ωl
2r
ωr =
2v+ωl
2r
(4)
In our experiments, we use p1 = 0.15, p2 = 0.01. The
constants used in Eq. 3 are EMP = BEMP = 2.032, and
E180 = 1.524, which are computed based on vmax and
ωmax. We also choose BE = 0 as we assume there are no
errors. The global tick is dt = 0.05s. The update periods of
Mission Planning, Navigation, and Inner-Loop & Plant are
4dt, 2dt and dt, respectively. We adopt the algorithm from the
Coursera course “Control of Mobile Robots” for the go-to-
target controller. The avoid-obstacles controller simply stops
the rover, as in [28]. The backtrack controller implements the
least-squares approach described in Section IV-B. In Mission
Planning, the choose-next-target controller picks the next
target in a sequence of pre-determined target locations when
the rover arrives at the previous target. The recharge controller
simply sets T = PS .
Fig. 3 shows the complete trajectory the rover takes with
the following configuration. The rover’s starting position is
P0 = PS 1 = (−1, 0, 0), its initial heading angle is θ0 = 0,
and the targets are T1 = (1.2, 0) and T2 = (0.3, 1.2), which
must be visited in that order. The power stations are located
at PS 1 = (−1, 0),PS 2 = (0.8,−0.5),PS 3 = (0.4, 0.9).
The black lines represent the forward paths and the red line
represents the backward path. The rover is able to reach T1
without having to recharge. At position BT = (0.895, 0.570)
on its way from T1 to T2, the battery level drops to B = 29.07,
triggering recharge mode. The rover re-traces the forward path
segment PS 2BT exactly (the red and black lines are indistin-
guishable) to recharge at power station PS 2. The battery level
when it reaches PS 2 is B = 0.07, indicating a tight switching
condition. After recharging to full capacity at PS 2, the rover
takes a different path to the last target T2. A video of the
simulation can be viewed at https://youtu.be/i8WGVD5Vk7U.
Fig. 3. Snapshot from a simulation showing the trajectory the rover takes to
visit targets T1 and T2 while ensuring the ES and CF properties.
V. QUICKBOT MISSION COMPLETION
The Simplex architecture is not intended for assuring gen-
eral liveness properties. This is reflected by the fact that a
Decision Module looks ahead one update period to determine
if the (safety) property in question is about to be violated; as
such, it will not be able to detect a violation of a liveness
property if the property’s time horizon is unbounded. As we
show here, however, the Simplex architecture can be made
to work with bounded liveness properties. In particular, we
design a CBSA for the Quickbot that assures a property called
Mission Completion (MC).
Recall that the mission of the Quickbot rover is to visit a
sequence of predetermined targets. The MC property ensures
that the rover completes its mission within a given amount of
time. This property is interesting in the context of Simplex
not only because it is a (bounded) liveness property, but
also because it is a higher-level mission-oriented property,
several layers of control removed from the physical plant.
The only physical parameter of the plant in question is
(real) time. The MC property is also more software-oriented
in nature, as it revolves around a data structure (a list of
mission targets). The MC property can be formally expressed
as G(F<T (all targets are visited)), where G and F are the
always and eventually operators in linear temporal logic, and
T is the upper bound on amount of time the rover needs
to complete its mission. The unbounded version of the MC
property is G(F (all targets are visited)). In other words, it is
always the case that the rover will eventually visits all targets.
In designing the CBSA for the MC property, we assume that
obstacles are stationary and there is a map showing the targets
and the location and shape of every obstacle. For simplicity,
we also assume that the rover has enough battery to operate
in the given mission-completion timeframe.
Similar to the case study in Section IV, the CBSA consists
of three single-rate components: Mission Planning, Naviga-
tion, and Inner-Loop & Plant. The main objective of the
Mission Planning component is to inform Navigation where
the next target is. The BC for Mission Planning simply outputs
one target after another, whereas the AC can generate inter-
mediate waypoints in between targets. The Mission Planning
component does not output the next waypoint or target until
the rover arrives at the current waypoint/target.
The AC can choose waypoints to optimize some criteria
according to its path-planning algorithm. Since the algorithm
used by AC can be uncertified, it may generate a time-
consuming path that violates the MC property. Another factor
that may cause a violation of MC is the manner in which
Navigation’s AC drives the rover through the waypoints to
get to targets.
The Navigation component steers the rover to the target
or waypoint computed by the Mission Planning component.
As such, it plays an important role in assuring the MC
property. Navigation alone, however, cannot guarantee MC
because it does not know the sequence of targets. What
it can do is to guarantee a bound on the time needed to
move from one location to another on the map when Mission
Planning activates its BC. The BC in Navigation is designed
to guarantee this bound.
The DM in Mission Planning uses the bound to check
whether a violation of MC is imminent. We say the rover
is about to violate the MC property if, in the next time step,
it may end up at a location from which the Navigation’s BC
is unable to navigate through the remaining targets in time.
When Mission Planning’s DM decides to switch, the switching
is cascaded to Navigation.
The contracts for Mission Planning and Navigation are as
follows. The Mission Planning component’s contract is:
Inputs: p
Outputs: T, ctlr
Assumption: ctlr = BC ⇒
∀(p1, p2), t(p1, p2) ≤ tu(p1, p2)
Guarantee: t(p, Tseq) ≤ remaining time
where p is the current position of the rover, T is the output
waypoint or target, ctlr ∈ {AC,BC} indicates which con-
troller is active in Mission Planning, t(p1, p2) is the actual
time needed to go from location p1 to p2, tu(p1, p2) is the
upper bound on t(p1, p2) and is based on Navigation’s BC,
Tseq is the sequence of remaining targets, t(p, Tseq) is the
actual time needed to complete the mission from p, i.e.,
t(p, Tseq) = t(p, Tseq[1]) +
∑n−1
i=1 t(Tseq[i], T seq[i+ 1])
where n is the size of Tseq, and remaining time is the
time until the mission completion deadline. The Navigation
component’s contract is:
Inputs: T, ctlr, p, ir, v, ω
Outputs: vT , ωT
Assumption: AP
Guarantee: ctlr = BC ⇒
∀(p1, p2), t(p1, p2) ≤ tu(p1, p2)
where ir, v, ω, vT , and ωT are as described in Section IV, AP
is the conjunction of assumptions 2-7 about the rover given in
Section IV.
The Inner-Loop & Plant’s contract is similar to the one
in Section IV. For the actual implementation of Navigation’s
BC, we can use the A* algorithm [29] to generate a collision-
free path between two points on the map. To bound the time
tu(p1, p2) needed to traverse this path, the BC can rely on just
two motion primitives: turning in-place and moving straight
ahead at a constant speed. The Mission Planning’s DM needs
a bound on the time needed for Navigation’s BC to complete
the entire mission. It can use tu(p1, p2) for this bound, which
can be calculated on-the-fly. If the map is not too large, we can
divide the map into grid cells and pre-compute the maximum
time needed for mission completion from each cell.
The switching condition is then derived as follows. We
first compute the region reachable by the rover in one update
period of Mission Planning. We then compute the maximal
t(p′, T seq), for p′ in the reachable region. The switching
condition is then t(p′, T seq) < remaining time − sMPdt ,
where sMPdt is the update period of Mission Planning. We
now provide a proof outline of the MC property.
Theorem 3. 〈true〉QB [sMP ] 〈MC 〉
Proof outline
1) We prove 〈ATU 〉MP [sMP ] 〈MC 〉, where ATU is the
assumption in MP ’s contract given above.
2) We prove 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈ATU 〉. By Lemma 1, this
implies 〈true〉 (Nav ‖ ILP) [sNav ] 〈ATU 〉.
3) Applying Rule AG, we conclude that
〈true〉 (MP ‖ Nav ‖ ILP) [sMP ] 〈MC 〉.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a component-based Simplex architecture
for assuring the runtime safety of component-based cyber-
physical systems, and a detailed case study that illustrates how
our proposed CBSA helps the Quickbot ground rover assure
two safety properties: energy safety and collision freedom. We
also presented a CBSA for Quickbot that ensures a bounded
liveness property called mission completion. As future
work, we plan to extend our case study to accommodate
uncertainties in actuation and sensor readings, and to
investigate the application of our component-based Simplex
architecture to UAVs and squadrons of UAVs. Another
direction for future work is to develop a design process for
CBSA that can be used to determine what guarantees each
component should provide to ensure a global property.
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APPENDIX
The proofs below follow the proof outlines given in Sec-
tion IV-D.
A. Proof of ES property
Proof of 〈ABE 〉MP [sMP ] 〈ES 〉 We prove
〈ABE 〉MP [sMP ] 〈ES 〉 by showing that if the ES property
holds at the end of time step i, then it holds at the end
of time step i + sMP , i.e., the next period of MP, where
i mod sMP = 0. The proof is easily extended to show
that the ES property holds continuously during the time
step. Let B′, p′,W ′, ctlr′ denote the values of B, p,W, ctlr,
respectively, at the end of time step i+ sMP . We prove that if
B > E(p, PS) then B′ > E(p′, PS). Since the rover traces
through a sequence of recorded waypoints W when going
back to PS, we have
E(p, PS) =
{
E180 + BE (p, PS,W ), if ctlr = AC
BE (p, PS,W ), if ctlr = BC (5)
There are four cases:
Case 1: ctlr = BC and ctrl′ = BC. The rover is in recharge
mode. The backtracking energy needed to backtrack from
current position p to the next position p′ is BE (p, p′,W ).
Therefore the battery level at the end of the next decision
period of MP is
B′ = B − BE (p, p′,W ) (6)
We assume that the ES property holds at current time, i.e.,
B > BE (p,PS ,W ) (7)
We want to prove that the ES property still holds at end of
the next decision period of MP i.e.,
B′ > BE (p′,PS ,W ′) (8)
The backtracking energy from current position p to PS can
be partitioned into BE (p, p′,W ) and BE (p′,PS ,W ′), i.e.,
BE (p,PS ,W ) = BE (p, p′,W ) + BE (p′,PS ,W ′) (9)
Re-arranging this equation gives:
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) = BE (p,PS ,W )− BE (p, p′,W ) (10)
Combining Eq. 7 and Eq. 10, we have:
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) < B − BE (p, p′,W ) (11)
Combining Eq. 6 and Eq. 11, we have:
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) < B′ (12)
According to Eq. 5, E(p′, PS) = BE (p′,PS ,W ′), therefore:
B′ > E(p′, PS). (13)
Case 2: ctlr = AC and ctrl′ = AC. The energy needed to go
from current position p to the next position p′ is FE (p, p′) ≤
EMP . The battery level at the end of the next decision period
of MP is:
B′ ≥ B − EMP (14)
We assume that the ES property holds at the current time, i.e.,
B > E180 + BE (p,PS ,W ) (15)
We want to prove that the ES property still holds at the end
of the next decision period of MP i.e.,
B′ > E180 + BE (p′,PS ,W ′) (16)
Note that if the rover detects a new power station PS ′ on
the way from p to p′ then the ES property still holds at the
end of the next decision period, because BE (p′,PS ′,W ′) ≤
BE (p′,PS ,W ′). ctrl = AC means the switching condition is
false, i.e.,
B > EMP + E180 + BEMP + (1 + BE )FE (PS , p) (17)
Since BE (p,PS ,W ) ≤ (1 + BE )FE (PS , p), we have:
B > EMP + E180 + BEMP + BE (p,PS ,W ) (18)
Combining Eq. 14 with Eq. 18, we have:
B′ > E180 + BEMP + BE (p,PS ,W ) (19)
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) can be partitioned into BE (p′, p,W ′) and
BE (p,PS ,W ), i.e.,
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) = BE (p′, p,W ′) + BE (p,PS ,W ) (20)
Energy needed to backtrack from p′ to p is bounded by BEMP ,
thus:
BE (p′,PS ,W ′) ≤ BEMP + BE (p,PS ,W ) (21)
Combining Eq. 19 with Eq. 21, we have:
B′ > E180 + BE (p′,PS ,W ′) (22)
According to Eq. 5, E(p′,PS ) = E180 + BE (p′,PS ,W ′),
therefore,
B′ > E(p′,PS ). (23)
Case 3: ctlr = AC and ctrl′ = BC. The rover is switching
from AC to BC, which means it must turn 180◦ before
backtracking. The battery level in the next decision period
of MP is:
B′ = B − E180 − BE (p, p′,W ) (24)
We assume that the ES property holds at the current time, i.e.,
B > E180 + BE (p,PS ,W ) (25)
We want to prove that the ES property still holds at the end
of the next decision period of MP i.e.,
B′ > BE (p′,PS ,W ′) (26)
Observe that if we let B180 = B−E180 then Case 3 becomes
Case 1 with the same proof.
Case 4: ctlr = BC and ctrl′ = AC. When MP switches from
BC to AC, the switching condition must evaluate to false, i.e.,
B > EMP + E180 + BEMP + (1 + BE )FE (PS , p) (27)
Thus, this case folds back to Case 2 with the same proof.
Proof of 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈ABE 〉
Since the decision ctlr from MP is hardwired to the switch
in Nav, we only need to prove that the backtrack controller
in Nav satisfies BE < (1 + BE )FE (PS , p). As discussed in
Section IV-B, the sequence of values of (v, ω) on the backtrack
path will have the same magnitudes as the ones on the forward
path. Therefore the backtrack energy will be the same as the
forward energy.
B. Proof of CF Property
Proof of 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈CF 〉
We prove 〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈CF 〉 by proving that
〈AP 〉AC2 [sNav ] 〈CF 〉 and 〈AP 〉BC2 [sNav ] 〈CF 〉. Since
AC2 is the same Simplex instance in [28], the proof of
〈AP 〉AC2 [sNav ] 〈CF 〉 is already available there. We show
that 〈AP 〉BC2 [sNav ] 〈CF 〉. Similar to the proof of
〈AP 〉Nav [sNav ] 〈ABE 〉, BC2 will track the forward path
exactly, in the reverse direction. Since the forward path is
collision-free as guaranteed by the proof that AC2 satisfies
the CF property, it immediately follows that the backtracking
path is collision-free as well, i.e., 〈AP 〉BC2 [sNav ] 〈CF 〉.
